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Abstract 
This paper studies the dynamic evolution of a joint venture that is 
initially formed due to the complementary strengths of two firms. We 
analyze the impact of the investment choices of the two partner firms on 
the fate of the joint venture. Investments that improve a firm's efficiency in 
the activity it performs in the joint venture (complementary investments) 
suffer from an incentive problem since benefits of such investments are 
shared between the two firms. To minimize the inefficiency caused by this 
incentive problem, the firm whose input is more valuable to the joint venture 
should receive a larger share of the joint venture revenues. When each firm 
invests in learning about the activity performed by its partner (competing 
investments) , the joint venture may itself fail since such investments reduce 
the synergy anslng from complementarity. If firms can choose between 
the two types of invèstments, the joint venture suffers from a coordination 
problem and t \Vo type of equilibria coexist: one in which both firms make 
complementary investments and the joint venture survives with increased 
complementarity and another in which firms make competing investments 
and the joint venture is taken over by one of the partners. 
JEL Codes: L23 , F23 
"' Lin: Department of Economics, Lingnan College, Hong Kong. 已mail: plin @l n.edu.hk. Saggi 
(corresponding author): Department of Economics, Southern Methodist University, Dallas, 
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1. Introduction 
A fundamental theoretical rationale behind joint ventures (JV s) is that firms with 
complementary strengths can benefit from joint production. This theoretical idea 
has substantial empirical support. In a recent survey of seventy six JV s in six 
developing countri白， more than sixty five percent of the respondents rated knowl-
edge of local politics, government regulations, local customs , and local markets 
as important considerations for seeking local partners (see Miller 的. al. 1995). 
Similar ly, more than seventy percent of the local firms in developing countri臼
sought out JVs with multinationals because of their superior product and process 
technologies ωwell as international reputation. 1 Similar findings for different 
countries are reported in Beamish (1987) and Selassie (1995).2 
Empirical evidence also indicates that a signi且cant number of JV s terminate 
in their early years. For example, Kogut's (1989) study of life histories of ninety 
two JVs revealed that thirty five of these failed within seven years.3 Even those 
that survive seem to have problems: a survey by Killing (1982) reports that thirty 
six percent of the partners in JV s found JV s to have performed unsatisfactorily. 
The more recent survey by Miller et al. (1995) also reports similar results: twenty 
seven percent of the JVs surveyed were not expected to survive by its partne乎﹒
Taking complementarity as the motivation for the existence of a JV, in this 
paper we explore the dynamic evolution of the enterprise.4 Our intuitive view of 
-I JVs frequently involve firms from different countries. Intuition suggests that scope for 
complementarities is bound to be large \\'hen firms come from different environments. For 
example, from 1979 to 1993, almost one hundred and seventy five thousand foreign investment 
projects were approved in China, of which approximately seventy percent took the form of a 
JV between a local firrn and a foreign firm and these accounted for approximately seventy five 
percent of the total inward foreign investment. (Source: Almanac of China's Foreign Relations 
and Trade 1994,) 
2See Mogi (1996) for a CEO~s overview of the JV between Kikkoman Coporation of Japan 
and President Enterprises of Japan. One strong rnotivation for this JV was the complentary 
strengths of the two firrns. Also, Luo (199ï) reports that guαnxi (local connections) by Chinese 
firrns 吼叫e an important factor leading to JVs between Chinese firms and foreign firms. 
3 As Kogut (1989) 的tes ， since such JV s are typically forrned between experienced firms , one 
would not expect failures rates to be so high. Since typically at least one of the partner firms 
continues to survive, the dernise of a JV is somewhat different in character frorn the usual failure 
(and shut down) of a business enterprise 
"\Ve should note that JVs may arise for reasons other than complementarity, As noted above, 
local governrnents often favor JVs over subsidiaries of multinational firms. Yu and Tang (1992) 
discuss other potential motivations for formation of JVs. These include: cost reduction, risk 
sharing, and competition reduction. See also Marjit et. a l. (1995) and Balakrishnan and Koza 
2 
the evolution of JVs is as follows. Joint production requires considerable informa-
tion exchange and substantial exposure to each other's production activity. This 
exposure and information exchange makes it possible (or perhaps inevitable) for 
each firm to learn to better perform the activity currently performed by its p位t­
ner. In other words , the very act of joint production under a JV may reduce the 
degree of complementarity between partners due to mutuallearning on their part. 
While some amount of learning may occur naturally due to close exposure to new 
techniques, substantial improvements in efficiency are likely to require costly and 
conscious inv臼tments by the two partners. We distinguish between investments 
that increase incentiv臼 for joint production (complementary investments) 台om
those that reduce such incentives (competing investments). We show that a sub-
stantial com peting investment by one or both partners red uces the synergy arising 
from complementarity and renders the JV an inefficient organizational form. 
How empirically plausible is the argument that mutuallearning occurs in JV s? 
Consider the following quotation 台om Li (1997) who reports the result of a d令
tailed study of eight JV s in China: 
It was found that learning \vas the major objective of both Chinese 
and foreign partners in forming a JV. The Chinese partners wanted to 
learn about process and prod uct technology, international marketing, 
and modern management , where品 foreign partners wanted to learn 
about local marketing, local management , and product technology in 
China. 
The possibility of learning from one's partner was also \vitnessed in the JV 
between Honda and Rover in the United I(ingdom. Pilkington (1996) , in his dis-
cussion of the Rover-Horída relationship, argues that a JV can become the means 
"to acquire the skills and capabilities which are needed for strategic development. 
This certainly proved the motive in the case of Rover and Honda.." Similar fac-
tors may be the motivation behind many international JVs in the auto industry 
\vhere US firms may have to sought to learn new Japanese management techniques 
such as just-in-time inventory. For example, consider the JV between Toyota and 
General 1-1otors (GM) established in 1984 called New United Motor Manufactur-
ing Company Inc. (NU j\1MI). Toyota 's unique management style and philosophy 
\vere introduced into NUìvlMI and GìvI executiv臼 made ~:active efforts to gain 
a thorough understanding of the Toyota's management practices. Part of this 
(1993) . 
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effort was the establishment of a technical liaison 0伍ce near the NUMM1 plant, 
which documented Toyota's management practices and conveyed this information 
to GM. Subsequently, GM adopted many of Toyota's practices and started using 
them in other pla帥" (World 1nvestment Report , 1995).5 
Like any other enterprise, JVs may fail for a multitude of reasons. The lit-
erature on international management , policy makers, and business consulting 
firms frequently contribute failure of JVs to external factors , such as demand 
shocks, incre泊ed competition, or government policy, as well as to internal disputes 
within the enterprise that may arise from cultural differences between partners 
and cl前hes between labor and management, etc. We believe that the internal 
evolution of the enterprise, holding constant the external environment, may hold 
important clues regarding the failure of JVs and that JVs may break up even in 
the absence of any explicit disputes between partners. Our analysis shows that 
the investment decisions of the two partners can very well be the crucial deter-
minant of the survival of a JV. To our knowledge, ours is the 趾st theoretical 
analysis of the dynamics of JV s based on the endogenous evolution of the degree 
of complementarity between partners. 
1n section 2 of the paper, we develop a benchmark model of a JV motivated by 
complementary strengths. 1n section 3, we examine the partners' incentive for in-
vestments that increase the synergy level of the JV (complementary investments). 
We show that complementary investments are sub-optimal from the viewpoint of 
the enterprise since each partner enjoys only a fraction of the marginal benefit 
of its own investment. Vle also sho\Y that , to minimize this ine伍ciency， the firm 
whose input is more important to the JV should receive more than half the JV's 
revenue. In section 4, we ana1yze investments that reduce the synergy of the JV by 
making partners more like each other. \Ve show that such competing investments 
can indeed 1ead to a break up of the JV in equilibrium and that they do not suffer 
from incentive problems since they resu1t in sole ownership of the enterprise. 6 
In section 5, we bring together our insights from the previous two sections 
by constructing a 1arger game in which the two firms can choose to make either 
a comp1ementary investment 0r a competing one. Here our ana1ysis revea1s that 
υ Usi時 data from US-Japan JVs , Nakarnura et. a l. (1996) provi 
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there exist two types of Nash equilibria: one in which the partners make competing 
investments leading to the failure of the JV and the other in which the JV surviv~可
with increased profitability as both partners select complementary investments. 
One may interpret this cφexistence of equilibria 臼 the intrinsic instability of JV s: 
those JVs choosing the complementary investment equilibrium will survive and 
grow and those that happen to choose the competing equilibrium will end up in 
a break-up. 
Finally, section 6 concludes. Proofs of all propositions and lemm臼 are pre-
sented in the appendix. 
2. Basic Model 
Consider two firms: firm 1 and firm 2 who form a JV to produce output z with 
two inputs x and y.7 For concreteness, think of input x as management and 
y as marketing. While both firms can supply both inputs, firm 1 is more effi-
cient at supplying x and firm 2 is more efficient at supplying y. We model this 
complementarity by employing the following production function for the JV: 
z = (81X1 + 82X2)α(γ1Y1 + γ2Y2戶， α+β< 1 
\vhere Xi (Yi) is the amount of input X (y) provided by firm 丸 and 81 > 82 > 1 and 
γ2 >γ1 > 1. Obviously, in the JV firm 1 supplies input x while firm 2 supplies 
input Y. The production function for the JV is given by 
zJ = AJxαYβ(2.1) 
\vhere A J 8 1 α勻 2β ， x X1 and Y Y2. 8 Parameters αand ß me前ure the 
inlportance of the t\VO inputs , respectively, to the JV. 
Let the cost (disutility) functions of the two inputs x and Y be given by C(x) 
and D(y) , C' > 0, C" ~三 0 ， D' > 0, and D" 三 O. For simplicity九 we consider the 
C也e \vhere C(x) = x and D(y) = y 
70ur benchmark model is similar to that of Eswaran and Kotwal's (1985) model of share-
cropping and that of Bl叫t.acharya and Lafontai肘's (1995) model of franchising. 
1:\ 1n the literature, the production function of the JV usually involves a random element ， η 
which has zero mean so that: zJV = A J\ ' ~rαUβ+η. This noise term implies that the JV p訂t­
ners ' individual efforts can not be inferred simply by observing the output , making cooperation 
between partners di伍cult. 1ncluding this random variable in our analysis would not affect our 
analysis because the random term disappears when we calculate the expected profits of both 
partners. 
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The revenue generated by the JV is shared by the two partners. Let ()i denote 
firm i's share of total revenue, where B1 + B2 = 1. As in Eswaran and Kotwal 
(1985) , the two firms choose their input efforts non-cooperatively to maxirnÏze 
their individual profits. 9 1n particular, firm 1 chooses x to solve the following 
problem: 
λ4αX B 1 AJxαUβ -x 
yielding the first order condition 
αB 1 AJxα-1yß = 1 
Similarly, firm 2 chooses y to solve the following problem: 
Max B2AJxαUβ -y 
yielding the first order condition 
ß2B2AJxαyß-1 = 1 
We can rewrite the two first order conditions as 
x= αB 1 zJ and y = ßB2zJ 
(2.2) 
Substituting these equations back into the production function in equation (2.1) 
yields the JV's output as well ωrevenue (price is normalized to one) 
zJ = (叫了才可 (αB 1 )兩(加2)南
Using the above revenue ì we calculate the profits of both firms as 
π{=B1 zJ -x=B1 (1 一 α)zJ
and 
π~. = B2zJ - Y = B2(1 - ß)zJ 
Adding the two gives the total value of the JV 





。 See Svejnar and Smith (1984) for a model ofa joint venture that explores resource allocation 
and profit distribution among partners under various institutional scenar ios . Unlike us , their 
main focus is on static issues. 
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Remark 1: Although the JV enjoys the synergy of complementarity, it suffers 
from the well-kno\vn problem of under-provision of inputs: each partner supplies 
less input than is jointly optimal since each receives only a faction of the marginal 
benefit of providing its input. Because of this problem, the JV does not necessarily 
generate higher revenue than a firm that is solely owned by one of its partners 
if the complementarity of assets within the JV is not very strong (i.e. , if the 
difference between 81 and 82 or bet\veenγ2 and γ1 is not large). As we will see, 
this observation is important in our discussion of competing investments in section 
4 below. 
Using the model developed above as a building block, we next turn to some 
dynamic issues. The next three sections will argue that when the two partners 
can make inv臼tments to improve their abilities at supplying the two inputs, their 
investment choices determine the evolution of the JV. 
3. Complementary Investments 
Suppose firm 1 can improve its ability at providing x by making a costly invest-
ment while firm 2 can do the same with regard to input y. Specifically, firm 1 can 
reach a target efficiency level of Ê:l1 by inv臼ting an amount d1(Ê:l 1 - 81), where 
d1 denotes the unit cost incurred in improving the e伍ciency of input x. Similarly 
firm 2 can r aise i ts e伍ciency of input y to r 2Y by investing an amount ~ (r 2 一 γ2).
For simplicity, \ve assume d~ = d1 = d. 10 
The structure of the investment game is as follo\vs. First the t\VO firrns choose 
their investment levels non-cooperatively. Next , given their efficiency at their 
respective activities; they choose their input levels and production takes place at 
the final stage. 11 To obtain a sub-game perfect N ash equilibrium, we solve the 
game backwards. 
At the output stage, the efficiency parameters Ê:l1 and r2 are given. The 
production function facing the JV is thus given by zl = Ê:lfrg xαUβ. The choice of 
input provision is exactly as solved in section 2. Using eqüation (2.3) we obtain 
lOResults change in an obvious manner when investment costs are asymmetric . 
11 Note that we assume that the e伍ciency parameters of individual inputs to the JV are 
observable though the level of inputs might not be so. It is hard to imagine how firms can 
form a JV if they do not knO\v each other ‘ s e伍ciency parameters that determine the degree of 
complementarity of their inputs 
the total output of the JV 
Zl (ß1, r 2 , ( 1 ) = (ßfr2β)亡土百 (α8d立丘吉 (ß (1 - O t} )τ丘吉.
3.1. Investment Stage 
At the investment stage, taking its rival's investment choice of r 2 as given, firm 
1 chooses ß 1 (ß 1 這 81 ) to maximize its JV profit net of its investment cost: 
Max 0 1 (1 一 α)Zl (ß1, r 2) - d(ß 1 - 8d 
The first order condition for the above problem is 
------L- 81(1 一 α) 學對 ------L-(α8dτZ百 (ß02) h;一βAl Iν-0-β = d (3.1) 1 一 α 一 β
which can be rewritten as 
ß 1 = J(.)r2立在百
where 
- 可 -~二三二且I (1 一 α)81 (α( 1 )正勾 (ß82 )正三百|門叫J(.)=|| d(l 一 α - ß) 
QU ρU V ' •• 
A 
O CU 9起m ri 
nn vu ' •• 
A 







J..1αx 82 (1 - ß)zl (ß1, r 2 ) - d(r2 一 γ2)
'\vith an analogous first order condition 
r2 = ]<(.)ß{-0-2ß (3.2) 
where 
. ...~三三二fi..
1 (1 - ß) (α( 1 ) l-~-ß (ß82 ) 再芒百 1 1 -0 - 213k(.)=|| d(l 一 α - ß) 
The above first order conditions explicitly define the reaction functions of the 
t'\vo firms. It is easy to see that these reaction functions are upward sloping. 12 
12The second order conditions for the firms are satisfied if 2α+β< 1 ， α+2β< 1, and the 
cost parameter d is sufficiently small. 
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Due to the complementary nature of the two firrns investments , an increase in in-
vestment by one firm increases the marginal benefit of the other firm's investment 
and, hence, its optimal investment. 
Let (ßr ，月) denote the pure strategy N叫1 equilibriurn investment levels of 
firms 1 and 2, respectively.13 Which firm has a stronger incentive to invest? The 
following proposition says that two crucial factors determining the investment 
incentives of the two firrns are the relative importance of their inputs (a versus 
β) and their JV shares 8 i . 
Proposi tion 1: The following hold: 
ωA;>FUf叫仰ly if 81 >朮 ωhere b 三鉗王說;
戶i) The relative investment by firm i increαses 凹th its share 0 f the J以
Consider the case where the two inputs are equally important for production 
(α=β). In this case, part (i) of proposition one inforrns us that firm 1 's invest-
ment is higher than firm 2's (ßr > r 2) if and only if its share of the JV revenue 
exceeds 50%. Likewise, when the firrns have equal shares in the JV (81 = 82 ) , it is 
easy to see that firm 1 makes a higher investment than firm 2 if and only ifα > ß. 
In general，五rm 1 invests more than firm 2 in equilibrium either if its share in the 
JV is higher th組 firm 1 's share or if the input it supplies to the JV is relatively 
important (i.e. ， αis big). For example, supposeα > ß. In this scenario, firm 
1 may still invest more than its partner even when its JV share falls below 50% 
provided it exceeds a certain thr臼hold (i.e. 81 >出)
It is also useful to examine the channels via which changes in the firrns' shares 
affect equilibrium investments. 14 Consider the effect of an increase in 81 on firm 
1 's equilibrium investment ßr. As 81 increases, ßr is affected in three different 
ways. First: an increase in 81 increases the marginal benefit of firm 1 's investment 
(its reaction function shifts up) incre的時 its incentive for investment. Second, an 
increase in 81 simultaneously decreases the marginal benefit of firm 2's investment 
(its reaction curve shifts do\vn). Since the t\VO firrns' investments are complemen-
tary, a reduction in firm 2's investment tends to decrease firm 1 's investment. 
Lastly, altering the share of a firm in the JV also affects the equilibrium at the 
output stage. This three effects interact to determine the net effect of a change in 
81 on the equilibrium of the investment game. vVhile algebraic complexity does 
not allow us to obtain clear cut results regarding the absolute investment levels 
1 :3 Straightforward algebraic manipulations show that this equilibrium exists and is unique. 
14 For example, governments in lesser developed countries often impose restrictions on the 
share of the JV that can be owned by a foreign partner . 
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of the two firms , part (“) of the proposition 1 says that an increase in a firm's JV 
share raises its incentive to invest , relative to its parlner. 15 
3.2. Under-Investment Problem and Optimal Revenue Sharing 
In the equilibrium derived above, each firm makes its decision without taking into 
account the benefit of its investment to its partner. Thus, the investments of the 
two firms are too low from the vie\vpoint of maximizing the value of the JV. In 
other words , JVs are plagued not only by a static inefficiency but also a dynamic 
one: not only is the JV's output is too low given the investment levels (due to the 
under-provision of inputs problem) , the partners also under-invest in improving 
their efficiency parameters. Thus, the investment incentiv臼 suffer doubly: the 
inefficiency at the output stage worsens the inefficiency at the investment stage. 
The severity of the under-investment problem depends crucially, of course, on 
how the firms share the JV's revenue. Next we examine the feature of the opti-
mal revenue-sharing scheme that minimiz臼 the ine伍ciency caused by the under-
investment problem. Let (.6. i(B 1 ) ，同 (Bd) denote the N ash equilibrium of the 
investment game. Let B~ denote the share of firm 1 that maximizes the JV's total 
profits given that firms choose their investments and inputs non-cooperatively: 
。~ =Arg max 7rJV - d.6.î - dr; = [B1 (1 一 α)+(1-B1 )(1- β)] zJ - d.6.î - dr; 
\vhere 
zJ=/(4 月，( 1 ) = [(.6. î)O (r;) ß]訂 (α( 1 )南 [ß(l 一的!南
The follo\vi I).g proposition states that the dynamically optimal arrangement of the 
JV requires that a firm get a larger share of the JV than its partner if and only 
if its input is more important than its partner's. 
Proposition 2: Assume that Q + 3ß < 1 aηd 3α + ß < 1. Then, Bî > ~ if 
and only if α > ß. 
The above proposition can be understood ωfollows. As \ve mentioned earlier, 
the under-provision of effort problem exists at both the output stage and the 
investment stage. The optimal revenue sharing arrangement aims at minimizing 
the combined ine伍ciency at the two stages. At the investment stage, if a firm's 
15 A local result for absolute investment levels can be shown for the symmetric case α = ß, 
15} = 1 '2 . Under equal sharing (8 1 = 82 ) , a small increase in a firm's share of the JV increases 
its equilibrium investment while it decreases the other firm's investment. 
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input is more valuable to the JV than its partner冶， then its investment is a1so 
more valuable to the JV. Thus, this firm should be given a larger share of the 
JV revenues in order to induce it to invest more. For the output stage, it is 
easy to prove a 'static optimum result': when the e伍ciency parameters are fixed , 
maximizing the JV's revenue (or profits) over the shar臼 Ði requires that firm 1 's 
share be greater than 1/2 if and only ifα > ß.IG Given this result , it is not 
surprising that the 'dynamic optimum r臼ult' in proposition 2 holds. 
We next examine the case where the two 且rms invest in im proving their ef-
ficiency of performing their partner's activity with the hope of taking over the 
JV. 
4. Competing Investments 
Consider the case where each party can make a costly investment to improve 
its ability of supplying the input currently supplied by it p位tner in the JV. In 
particular, firm 1 can increase the level of γ1 in order to reduce its disadvantage 
relative to firm 2 in performing activity y , and firm 2 can invest to raise 82 (its 
efficiency in activity x). The unit costs of investment for the firms are dÏ and 
d乞 respectively. Thus, by investing an amount dÏ (f 1 一 γ1)' firm can raise its 
effectiveness of input y to f 1 from the original level γl' and firm 2 can raise its 
efficiency of input x to ~2 by investing an amount d2(~2 - 82 ) 
The timing of moves is as follo\vs. The t\vo firms simultaneously choose their 
investments f 1 and ~2. 8ince such competing investments lower the synergy of 
the JV, the JV may cease to be the most e伍cient organizational form after such 
investments have been made. 80, at t he next stage of the game, the organizational 
form (s01e o\vnershi p by Qne of the two firms or the JV) that 1eads to the high臼t
total pro且ts prevails. If the JV fails 了 a 五rm buys out its partner (see below) and 
the latter exits the market. In the last stage, production takes p1ace under the 
organization form t.hat. prevails in the previous stage. 
1 G In particular , maximizing the JV's total revenue yields firm 1 's(statically) optimal share 
to be 81 =夭百 and maximizing the JV's total profits leads to 81 = 在于了 Both 叫utions
1+ 、/行計ifff
have the feature that 81 > 0.5 if and only ifα 〉 β
11 
4.1. Output Stage 
The output decisions, of course, depend upon the organizational form under which 
production takes place. Given r 1 and ð.2 , the JV continues to operate if the 
complementarity is still relatively strong (i.e. , if 7rJ 三 max{付， 1叫 where 可
denot臼 firm i's payoff as a sole owner de加ed below). The firms' investments 的
useless in this c臼e since the JV continues to operate b臼ed on the old efficiency 
parameters. 
If firm 1 produces on its own, its production function is given by 
Zl = (8 1 x)O(r1y)β 
It solv臼 the follo\ving problem: 
llttZ Z1-Z-U 
The first order conditions are 
α81αr1 ßXO-1yß = 1 個d ß81 or1βzαUβ-1 = 1 
which can be rewritten 前 x= αZl and y = ßZ1. Solving for Zl yields 
Zî = (r 1 ) 亡~(8~αα的計可
The corresponding pro且t for firm 1 is gi ven by 
πî = zî - x - y = (1 一 α- ß)zî. 




九= (1 一 α-2)4where z;=AF=百 (γfdββ)τ土ïJ (4 .4) 
4.1.1. Buy-Out of the JV 
If a firm invests a su血cient amount
, 
the JV becomes less productive than a solely 
owned enterprise. 1 7 If the JV fai1s
, 
we 臼sume that the firm with the more efficient 
form of organization (the higher π:) buys out the other firm by paying the latter 
a price equa1 to Bj付 18
17The exact condition for π i > 7r J can be obtained by comparing equations (4.3) and (2.6). 
1~ 1f firm j's invetsment level is so low thatπ;<πJ ， the buy-out price equals firm j's old JV 
revenue
, 
e j 7r J 
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The formulation of this buy-out price can be understood as follows. After 
making a competing investment，趾m 1 is capable of enjoying the payoff (gross) 
可 but this requires that firm 2 be willing to sell its share of the JV. Of course, 
firm 2 is also capable of enjoying the (gross) payo叮叮 if firm 1 agrees to sell i ts 
part of the JV. Since both firms may prefer to be buyers rather than sellers, we 
assume that the following procedure is used to terminate the JV. Suppose, by way 
of illustration , that 可>叮(>的 Fi肘， the two firms sell the JV to a “third 
party" at the price 7r J which is then split between the partners in accordance 
wi th their shares of the JV. Then, this third party sells all the assets of the JV 
in an auction in which the two partners bid for the rights to the entire JV. The 
outcome of the auction is that the partner with the highest valuation (firm i in this 
example) wins by paying 可 to firm j. Lastly, the (neutral) third party distributes 
i ts own profi ts from the auction，可一 πJ ， to the partners according to their initial 
shares of the JV. Under the above procedure，位rm i's payoff equals the surn of 
the following three terms: 
BiπJV + (π; 一 π;) + Bi (π; 一 πJ) =π; 一 (1 - Bi ) π; 
Firm j' payoff then equals its initial JV profits plus its fraction of the “auction" 
profits: 
B(líJV + Bi ( π; 一 πJV)=OF;
Under the above buy-out price specification, the payoff of firm i , gross of its 
investment cost , is given as follows: 1U 
TK== 
佇*-(]，;7ï~H 戶V J" J' 
.~[汁; - Bj 7ï jJ + ~Bi汁:1
Bi甘i'
if 汁* >π; 
if π* 什;
if π* <π; 
One could imagine other methods of terminating the JV that result in buy-out 
prices di旺'erent from the one that results from the procedure outlined above. For 
example
, 
one could assume that firm i can buy out firm j's share of the JV by 
paying it the amount Bj 7r J - i.e. its current payoff as a partner in the JV. The 
problen1 with this price is that it ignores the fact that firm j too has the option 
of investing and operating the JV solely - in other words
, 
it lets firm i choose the 
1!J If the firms are equally prodl以iv巳 i.e. ， if ππ; ， the buying out party is determined by 
a coin toss 
,,
'ith each firm having an equal chance of being the buyer and the seller. 
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terms of the buy out. By contra.st , our procedure recognizes that both firms have 
the option of making competing investments and each firm may be unwilling to 
sell its share of the JV at a price which do臼 not let it profit from the option of 
making a competing investment. In our view, the results that follow should go 
through with any procedure which allows both firms to bene且t from the option of 
making a competing investment. 
4.2. Investment Stage 
Knowing that their future payoffs are given by Vi above, firms make their invest-
ment choices simultaneously. Let ri denote firm l's optimal investment given 
that it buys out the JV 企om its partner: 
r; 三 Argmax 可(r 1 ) 一 (r1 一 γl)di - ()2可(ß2 )
where 
一~ ，~~ ~. ~r:l πi(r1 ) = (1 一 α- ß)(r1 )ï一。一β(可以伊)亡Z百.
The first order condition for the above problem is20 
ß(ri) 空望著 (ðfaOßß)詰百 = â-{. (4.5) 
We similarly define ß 2 for 五rm 2's optimal investments , a.ssuming it buys out 
firm 1: 
ß; 三 Argmax π;(~2) 一 (~2 - ð2)d~ - ()1πi(rd 
\vhere \ve must have 
α(~;) 羊望著(活αoßß) l-~-ß = d~. 
A question of interest is t出ha抗t i叮f the t村1叭wo
(4.6) 
\V hich firm invests more aωs the buying out party? The following ru:岱弓sumpμti幻on prov臼
凶脫ef仇剃臼ωu叫1 i圳n叭lS叫O叫la前仙tin呵gt伽hee旺b伽e倪ct叫oft伽he昀c∞on叫1吐tr巾i跆bu叫I此tion叫∞p仰缸a仰meters (α and ß) on the firms' 
incentives for investment: 
Assumption 1:γf=6? 
Assumption 1 is a symmetry a.ssumption \vhich levels the playing field among 
the t\VO firms when they compete in investments. It essentially means that the 
20The second order condition is satisfied ifα+2β< 1 and di is small. Similarly, the second 
order condition for firm 2's problem below holds if 2α + ß < 1 and d2 is small 
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two firms are equally advantageous in supplying the input in which they enjoy an 
efficiency advantage with respect to their partner. 
From equations (4.2) , (4.3) , and (4.4) we know that 
*\* 7r 1 .;> 7r 1 三- 11 2 
1 1' * \β... ^  *、 α
牛=今 z~ > z~ 仁=>1 二1. \ > (二三}
\γ2J \ 01 J 
Imposing assumption 1 implies that 
π; 三 π; 但中 (ri)β 三 (ß;)α (4.7) 
Thus , both the value of the two firm's investments as well as the importance of 
each partner's input to joint production play a role in determining the identity of 
the \vinner (i后， the firm that ends up buying out the JV). 
From inequality (4.7) it follo\vs that when α= 仇 the firm that makes the 
higher investment buys out the JV. Ifα>β， this inequality implies that firm 1 
must make a higher investment than firm 2 to be able to buy-out the JV. Note 
that α>βimplies that input supplied by firm 1 in the JV (input x) is more 
valuable than the input supplied by firm 2. Thus, the firm with the more vαluable 
input actually has to invest a greater amount to beat out the other firm. 明屯的
matters at the investment stage is the value of the activity the two firms are 
investing in: when α> ß, firm 2 is investing in a relatively more valuable activity 
than firm 1 and consequently hωa stronger incentive to invest. 
Proposition 3: Suppose di = d2 α叫 Assumption 1 holds, then ri < ß;σ 
αnd only if α > ß. 
The above proposition informs us of the stronger investment incentive faced 
by the partner who supplies the weaker input to the JV. Contrast this result with 
the c泊e of complementary investments: in that scenario firm 1 has a stronger 
incentive to invest iffα > ß. Here, firm 2 h臼 a stronger incentive to invest when 
α> ß. The roles of the t\VO firms are reversed under competing investments: 
under both scenarios , \vhenα> ß, investing in improving the efficiency of input 
x is more valuable. 
If a firm gets bought out, its payoff equals 8i 7r;. Let r~ denote firm 1 's optimal 
investment given that it is bought out by firm 2: 
r~ 三 Arg m a..-x 8 1πi (r 1) 一 (r 1 一 γ 1 )cf{ 
Similarly, define 
ß; 三 Argmax 82π;( 6.2 ) 一(6.2 - ð2)d~ 
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Since ()i < 1, it immediately follows that r; < ri and ß~ < ß 2. 
Note that the buying-out party's net payoff strictly decre臼es with its rival's 
investment. This is because the buy-out price strictly increases with the bought-
out P征ty's investment. Consequently, there exists a critical level of investment 
on firm 2's part \vhich makes firm 1 indifferent between buying out firm 2 and 
getting bought out itself. This critical investment ßf is defined by 
可(r~) 一 (r~ 一 γ1) cf{ - ()2可 (ßf) = ()1吋 (r~) 一 (r~ 一 γ1) cf{
In the above equation, the left hand side gives firm 1 's payoff given that it invests 
ri and buys out firm 2 (who invests ßf) where前 the right hand side giv<白血rm
1 's payoff given that it invests r~ and sells its share of the JV to firm 2. 
Similarly, we can define rf as follows 
π;(ß;) 一 (ß; - 82)d~ - ()1π~(rf) = ()2π;(ß;) 一 (ß; - 82)d~ 
That is , rf is the level of investment on the part of firm 1 that makes firm 2 
indifferent between buying out and bought out. 
N ow we are ready to analyze investment competition between the two firrns. 
For simplicity, we first consider the symmetric c臼e where the two firms are iden-
tical in every aspect: ()1 = ()2 ， α = ß, 81 =γ2 ， and dÏ = d2. Later, we comment 
on the asymmetric case. In the symmetric case, we must have ri = ß; , 們 =ß~
and rf = 6.f. In addition, we can show the following: 
Lemma 1: FOT the symmetric cαse， the folloωing hold: 
(i) 6.; < 6.f < 6.;, and 
戶i) The b叫 Tesponse function of firm 1, denoted by Bl (6.2) , is given by 
Fipi /tlt
』〈
htt--一-qL A B 
if 、-IJIIEY
C2C2 AA <一>-AA 
if 





if r , < r? ) 1. 1 
r , > r? I 1. 1 ) if 
The reaction functions can be interpreted as follows. If firm 2 does not improve 
its efficie叭y in activity x at all (.6. 2 = 82) , firm 1 's optimal investment is given 
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by ri. Firm 1 will continue to invest the same amount if the investment by firm 
2 is so small (ð.2 < ð.f) that firm 1 prefers to buy-out firm 2 than be bought out 
itself. Ho\vever, when ð.2 > ð.f ，位rm 2's inve討mer札 and the buying-out price 前
a result , is so high that for firm 1 buying out is less profitable than being bought 
out so that it reduces its own investment to r~ .21 These reaction functions yield 
the following proposition. 
Proposition 4: The symmetric competing investment 9αme hαs two pure 
strategy N ash equilibria: (ri , ð.;) and (吭，勾). In the (I了，ð.;)你Lilibrium， firm 
1 buys out 少m2 仙的as in the 們， ß;) equilibrium firm 2 buys out firm 1. 
The above proposition establishes that investment competition between the 
two partners can indeed lead to the demise of the JV. In either equilibrium, a 
firm buys out its partner by investing the optimal amount. The bought-out party 
also invests in competing investment in order to receive the optimal buy-out price, 
though its investment is useless after the break-up of the JV. 
If firms are not identical, as is normally the case, proposition 4 remains valid 
as long as the degree of asymmetry between the firms is not high. For example, 
supposeα > ß. Then, the best response functions of the firms still have the same 
shape as stated in lemma 1, and there would still be two equilibria. However, 
the buying叫 party in the (ri , ß;) equilibrium, i.e. firm 1, will invest 1臼s than 
the buying-out party in the (吭， ß;) equilibrium, i.e. firm 2, because ri < ð.; by 
proposition 3. 
5. Both Types of Investments 
The previous two sections explored two different models that highlight the in-
centives for t\vo different,:types of investments faced by the partners in a JV. In 
this section~ \ve consider a model in which each partner may invest in improving 
its e伍ciency in providing either of the two inputs. The basic insight we \vant to 
provide (or confìrm) is that since complementary investments are mutually re~n­
forcing \vhile competing investments are mutually destructive, a JV may evolve 
into one of two possible equilibria: In one equilibriurn, the partners both opt 
for complementary investments and the JV stays alive \vith an increased level 
21 Since the JV enjoys a synergy due to complementarity but suffers from the under-provision 
of input problem , a firm must invest a su伍ceint amount in order for it to become more productive 
than the JV and be able to buy' out its partner. Here we assume that the optimal investments 
rî and ß; are sufficient to render the JV an inefficient organizational form , \丸'hich must be true 
if, say, the costs of i盯estment (dt and d2) are sufficiently low. 
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of complementarity. In another equilibrium, the two partners choose competing 
investments , reducing the complementarity of the JV thus causing it to fail. 
To simplify the analysis, we assume that firms can make both complementary 
and competing investments only at fixed levels by paying some fuced investment 
cost. Specifically, by investing an amount 月， firm i can reach a target e伍ciency of 
ß i in input 凡 and by investing an amount G i , firm i can reach a target e伍ciency
of f i in input y. We first consider the cωe where each firm has three strategies 
(Si = 0, ß i or f i ). Later in this section, we examine the more general c品e where 
firms can choose both complementary and competing investments simultaneously, 
i.e. , ß i and f i is also a fe泊ible strategy. 
We consider the simplest possible scenario and make the following set of nat-
ural assumptions: 
A2. Symmetry αssumption: 81 =仇， α = ß,81 = γ2. 82γ1. ß 1 = r 2 = 
X , ß2 = f 1 = Y，只 = F, and G i = G. In other words , the following are assumed: 
(i) firms share the JV revenue equally; 何 both inputs are equally important fl伽O叮r 
P防仰r昀od伽uct叫ωio叫n叫; 戶例t蚓吵 b切ot出h firms 缸盯e equally disadvantaged at performing t伽he 0的th加1昀ler叮
activity; and 戶U吵1) the feasible amount of investments of both types as well as the 
corresponding costs for each type of investment are the same for both firms. 
In what follo\vs , to economize on notation, we denote the initial JV revenue 
1f/ (81, 12) by just 1f/. Note that under the symmetry assumptions ， πf=4. 
M司len descri bing our other ωsumptions ， \ve refer only to firm 1 although they 
apply to both firms. 
A 3. Unilateral incentive for a complementary investment: π{(X， γ2) 一π{> F. 
This assull1ption means that a firm finds it profitable to make a complementary 
investment even when its partner chooses not to invest. Since a complementary 
investment by one firm in肌l比cr閃e泊e臼s the other fi趾rm'冶s incentive for a complementary 
1n\盯v呵r吧es仗tmen風 &泊約兮ss叩u山凹mp抖ti幻on A3 automatically implies that π{(X ， X) 一 π{(X， γ2) > F 
A4. Unilαteral incentive for a competing investment: πi(Ól ， Y) - G >什J
That is, it is profitable for a firm to make a competing investment in order to buy 
out its partner. 
5.1. High Value of a Complementary Investment 
\Ve first consider the case \vhere the parameter values are such that 
可(Ó1 ， Y) <πJ(Ó1 ， X) (5.1) 
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That is , a complementary investment by either firm is sufficient to make the JV 
the most profitable organizational form even if its partner makes a competing 
investment. 
Each firm has tlrree strategies: Si 巴 {O ， X , }'}. Under the assumptions made 
above, the payoff nlatrix for this symmetric investment game (gross of investment 
costs) is given by: 
。 X Y O 7rJ IT 7f~ - -
X 可(X， 12)' 可(X， 12) 刊(X， X )， 吋(X， X) -
Y πi(81 ， Y) 一 π2 ， πj 吋(8 1 ， X) ， 可(81 ， X) 折iJQ1' Y) , ~付 (8 1 ， Y)
Note that , since inequality (5.1) holds , only the cells (Y,O) and (Y, Y) corr令
spond to a failure of the JV. The JV stays alive even under (Y, X) because firm 
2's complementary investment outweighs firm 1 's competing investment. Under 
(Y, Y) each firm has a fifty percent chance of buying out the JV. Its corresponding 
payoff, under the symmetry assumption A2 , equals 
1 r 1 1 "' _ _ _, 1 三 |π~(81 ， Y) 一二π;(Y， γ2) +一π~(81 ， Y)1 =一π~(81 ， Y). 2 1" " 1 \ - ~) - I 2 ~ \ - ) I ~I 2 1 \ ~ ~ I - I J 
We can show the following result: 
Proposition 5: Suppose A2-A4 αnd ineqωlity (5.1) hold. Then, there exist 
tω N ash equilib門ι (X， X) and (Y: Y) ， σ 
F-G 主佇立617X)-1πi(81 ， Y"). (5.2) 
.:. \ 2 
Otherwise~ (X , X) is the pnly Nash equilibrium 
The above proposition says that~ regardless of \vhether inequality (5.2) holds or 
not，伏 ， X) is an equilibrium in \vhich both firms making complementary invest-
ments and the JV stays alive. This result follows from condition (5.1). However, 
if inequality (5.2) holds , then there exists another equilibrium (Y, Y) in which 
both firms make competing investments and the JV fails. Given firm 1 plays Y , 
firm 2 can either play X in \vhich c泊e it keeps the JV alive, or it can play Y . 
Since X may be more costly than Y (F > G) , a scenario consistent \vith condition 
(5.1) in that a more valuable complementary investment is also likely to be more 
expensive, firm 2 \vill choose Y if inequality (5.2) holds. In this case, (Y, Y) is also 
a Nash equilibrium. We next examine the case \vhere a competing investment is 
relatively nlore valuable than a complementary investment. 
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5.2. High Value of a Competing Investment 
Suppose that contrary to the c品e discussed above, we have 
πi(8 1 ， Y) > πJ(8 1 ， X). (5.3) 
In other words, if firm 1 picks a competing investment, the JV ceas臼 to be the 
dominant organizational form even if firm 2 makes a complementary investment. 
In this c品e the payoff matrix (gross of investment costs) for the investment game 
is given by: 
。 X Y 。 7TJ 1 ， π2 JX 叫(X， γ2) ，可 (X， γ2) 可 (X， X) ， 叫 (X， X) -
Y 可(81 ， Y) 一吋Tπd 叫 (81 ， Y)-~可 (82 ， X) ， !可 (82 ， X) iπi(81 ， Y) 
This payoff matrix differs from the previous one only in (Y, X) box. Now, a 
competing investment by either firm is sufficient to end the JV. Such a situation is 
likely when the e伍ciency improvement under a competing investment is large rel-
ative to the efficiency improvement attained under a complementary investment. 
Accordingly, we 臼sume the following assumption .holds: 
什i(8 1 ， Y) - G 一封 >π{(X， ì2) - F (5 .4) 
In other \vords , a competing investment Y is more profitable for firm 1 than a 
complementary investment X , given that firm 2 invests nothing. 
Proposition 6: Supposε that assumptions A2-A4, inequalities (5.3) and (5.4) 
hold. Then (X,X) is α Nash equilibrium of the gar附 σ
可川)-HAX) 一 G 三刊(X， X) 一 F (5.5) 
Otherwise, the Nash equilibria ofthe game belong to the set {(Y, 0) , (Y, X) , (Y, Y)} 
Under condition (5.3) , a unilateral competing investment by one firm is suf-
五cient to render the JV an ine伍cient organizational form even if the other firm 
makes a complementary investment. This tends to make the JV very unstable and 
likely to fai l. This instability is reflected in the fact that if condition (5.5) is not 
satisfied , the JV fails even if one of t.he two firms makes a competing investment, 
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i.e. if inequality (5.5) is not valid then the only equilibrium pattern is the failure 
of the JV \vhich takes place in either (Y,O) , (Y, X) , or (Y, y).22 
When condition (5.5) is 叫isfi叫 (X， X) can also be an equilibrium.23 Es-
sentially, this happens when a competing investment is more costly than a com-
plementary investment (G > F) , which is consistent with the high value of a 
competing investment assumption (5.3). If this cost differential is relatively large, 
(X, X) may indeed be an equilibrium and the JV stays alive. Also note that if 
firm 1 deviates 企om (X, X) to (Y, X) , it also has to pay firm 2 the buy-out price 
equal to ~可(82 ， X).
The basic insight provided by the above two propositions is ωfollows. JVs 
suffer from an instability problem in that the inv<臼tment game has two equilibria, 
one in which the JV stays alive and the other in \vhich it breaks down, regardless 
of whether the parameter valu臼 favor the JV (condition (5.1)) or not (condition 
(5.3)). 
6. Conclusion 
The major point of this paper is that since complementarity is an important moti-
vation for the formation of JV s, \ve must look to the evolution of complementarity 
between JV partners in order to better understand the dynamics of JV s. Using a 
benchmark static model of a JV based on complementarity between its partners, 
\ve have argued that the evolution of this complementarity can be determined 
endogenously via the investment choices made by the t\vo partners. In the com-
plementary investment game, \ve characterize how firms' incentives to incre臼e the 
synergy of the JV depend on the importance of their inputs to the JV, as well as 
their shares of the JV:s revenue. The very nature of a JV, i.e. partners share the 
fruit of the JV , leads to under-provision of effort in both the investment stage and 
the output stage. It is sho\vn that the optimal revenue sharing scheme has the 
feature that the partner \vhose input is more important to the JV should control 
a majority of the JV shares. 
In the competing investment game , we have examined JV partners' incentives 
to learn fronl each other, and shown that such mutuallearning can indeed lead to a 
break-up of the JV. In the last part of the paper, \ve consider a model in which both 
22 Ìvlore restrictions on parameter values can be imposed to clearify when each of the three 
strategy pairs are an equilibrium. But, this is unnecessary since we are only interested in the 
JV breaking up in equilibrium. 
2J Condition (5 .4) is 的t needed for (X , X ) to be an eq山libriu Ill.
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partners can choose the type of its investment. This more general model brings 
together the insights of the previous two models and shows how multiple N臼h
equilibria cφexist even under assumptions that favor the continuation of the JV. 
Thus , JVs may suffer from a lack of co-ordination: complementary investments 
may indeed be in the interest of both parties but the very possibility of imbibing 
each other's skills leads firms to makes competing investments that lead to the 
demise of the JV. 
How JV partners share the revenue generated from joint production is one of 
the most sensitive and crucial policy issues in many international joint ventures. 
Our analysis offers the insight that the share issue is not merely a matter of control, 
it may determine the very fate of the JV through its effect on the evolution of 
the complementarity between partner firms. Although we explicitly examine the 
share issue in only the complementary investment game, it is not hard to see that 
optimal determination of the JV shares, can prolong the life of the JV in both the 
competing investment game and the twφtype investment game of section 5. In 
particul缸， when the shares are chosen to minimize the under-provision of efforts 
problem (i.e. to maximize the value of the JV) , a buy-out becomes less likely in 
the competing investment game (可 > 7r J is less likely to hold). Similarly, in the 
3 x 3 game of section 5, the optimal sh位es maximize the synergy of the JV via 
complementary investments making condition (5.2) in proposition 5 less likely to 
hold and condition (5.5) in proposition 6 more likely to hold. As a result, the 
(X, X) equilibrium is more likely to arise relative to the 忱的 equilibrium.
Finally, \ve offer some comments on the generality of the analysis contained in 
this paper. Although \ve use the Cobb-Douglas production function to model the 
complementarity of the JV partners , \ve believe that most of the results obtained 
in this pa per \vill continue to hold in a more general model. In fact , Proposition 
5 and 6 are based on general profit functions \vith no reference to the Cobb-
Douglas production function at all. The main point of Proposition 1, namely that 
the partners' incentive for complementary investments incre臼e with the impor-
tance of t.heir inputs to the JV, obviously is a general one. The same can be 
said about proposition 3 \vhich says that a firm's competing investment incentive 
increases with the importance of its partner's input to the JV. The C 
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function; the derivation of the optimal and the criticallevel of investment, as well 
as the best rωponse function, hold generally. 
7. Appendix 
7.1. Proof of Proposition 1 
From the first order conditions of the two firms we have: 
L\i fh (1 一 α)α
r 2 ()2 (1 - ß)ß (7.1) 
which straightforwardly implies part (的 of the proposition. 
When ()i = 1/2,equation (7.1) implies that r; > L\i iffβ 一 α >(ß 一 α)(ß+ α).
Since 1 >β+α，the second inequality holds iff ß > α.. 
7.2. Proof of Proposition 2 
To prove the proposition, we need first to examine how changes in JV shares affect 
the equilibrium investment levels and to establish lemma 2 below. 
At the Nash equilibrium, firm 1 optimizes over L\1 
M仰。1(1 一 α)zJ(缸， r2 ， ()1) - d(L\ l - 81) 
yielding the 五rst order condition 
。 θzJ(l~q ， r2 ， ()1) d 
一1θL\ l 1 一 α (7.2) 
The above equation implicitly defines firm l 's best response function L\1 = L\1(r2). 







wh仙 is positive since ð~:在 >0 叫宏緝j<0b句y叭t伽t
the problem. 
Firm 2 maximiz臼 over r 2 
M ax (1 - ed(l - ß)zJ (L\ l , 口， ()d - d(r2 一 γ2)
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yielding the first order condition 
θZl( 6. 1 ， r2 ， 01d (1 - ( 1 ) θr2 1 - ß' (7.3) 




θ6. 1 一對 ___ 'v 
The N ash equilibrium is stable if the slope of firm 1 's best response function is 
steeper than that of firm 2 at the equilibrium. This condition can be written as:24 
δ2Z1 θ2Z1 ( θ2ZJ\2 
δAi 否Z> 人 δ6. 1θr2 ) (7.4) 
To see how the equilibrium depends on 01 , we differentiate both sides of the 
two first order conditions (7.2) and (7.3) , respectively, with respect to 01 , and 
rearrange terms, to obtain 
θ2Z1 β企1θ2ZJβr?θZl θ2Z1
0 1 一一一一一土 +0， 一二=一一一一 - 0, θ6.1θ0 1 . -~δ6. 1 ar2θ0 1 δß1θß180 1 
and 
θ2ZJθß1θ2Z1 ar2θZl θ2Z1 (1-0 1 ) 一一+ (1 - ( 1 )一τ一一=一一一 (1 - ( 1 ) θt~qθr2θ0 1 . \ - - ~ / 8r~δ0 1 θr2θr2θ01 
Solving for 說~ and 訝 we get 
and 
where 
δß 1 1 ‘「 θZl θ2Z1 θZl θ2Z1 ~l |一 (1 - ( 1 )一一一-r-h一一 +GI θ吭吭(1-0dBI δß 1 ar~ θr2θß1θr2 ' -1 
θr2 . 1 rδZl θ2ZJθZl θ2Z1 ,. J 
1 (1 - ( 1 ) 一 <:\n <:\ ^ + 0 1 :~ -<:\:? + H 1 θ吭吭(1 - OdB I θß1θr2θ6. 1 T vl θr2θßî '''', 
B Nθ'2 Z1 ( 的~ )2 
一 θAiθr~ \δ6.1θr2 ) 
24It can be shown that for the Cobb-Douglas production function the stability condition is 
satisfied if and only ifα。< (1- 2α- ß)(l 一 α-2β) which holds ifαand ß are not too large. 
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(7.5) 「 δ2Z1 θ2ZJθ2Z1 δ2Z1 1 G 三。1(1-01)|||θf2θß1θf2θ81θr2δß1θ81 I ' 
(7.6) 「 θ2Z1 θ2ZJθ2Z1 δ2Z1 1 H 三。1 (1 - ( 1) I 一一一 | |δf2θß1δß1θ81θAiθf2θ8 1 I 
and 
Note that B > 0 by the stabi1ity condition (7.4). 
Lemma 2: 1f α>β and 81 < 1/2, then the folloωing hold in equilibrium: 
ω 託>託;
( ii) ~~~ > 0, G > 0, H > 0; 
( iii) 對> 0, if 3ß + α<1 
Proof: -By the first order conditions determi凶ng (6.i , f;) , we get 






削a油圳b叫1is址t叫 pa叫r此t (射ωi). 'D臼op戶rove (i“i)趴圳)，i沁 e伽削&鈞的弓吐i恥1)
have the same sign 俗話 It is straightforward to show that the J\尸s output, zl , 
as a function of 81, is maximi叫 at 81α/(α+β) ， given 6.1 and f 2. Thus , 
~~~ > 0 for 8 < 1/2. This proves (“) 
Straightforward a1gebra shows that 














1 - 81 . (3月 1
81 ./ 1:一切一 α ~V1 \1+ 亡在三
is equivalent to 
Since α+3β< 1 implies 晶可< 1 : 也e 1前t inequality holds for 81 < 1/2. This , 
峙伽 \vith G > 0, implies 削兮兮f>0.
vVe next prove proposition 2 by showing that when α>βthe joint payoffs 0 1' 
the two partners Hl \vhere 
W 三什lV _ dß~ - df; = [e 1 (1 一 α) + (1 - ed(l - ß)] zl - dßi - df; , 
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increases with ()1 for all ()1 三 1/2. By the Envelope Theorem, we have 
θZl θr2θZl a八'。 1(1 一 α)一一一一+ (1 - ()d(l 一 β)一一一」θr2θ81 ~1θ()1 
~_1 ~_1 
+()1 (1 一 α)二二一+(卜。1)(1 - ß) 二二一.θ81θ()1 
θIV 
θ()1 
Fi叫 note that parts (i)-(“) of the 的ove lemma imply that 訢> 0 if 
θr2β八，E 三角 (1 一 α)一一+ (1 - ( 1)(1 - ß) 一~~ > 0 θ81θ81 
Using 伽 expressions for ~去 and 對 and deriv 
(1 - ()d (1 - ß)G + ()1 (1 一 α)H
_ , ßzl ( ß2z1\ 月Zl ( [j2 z \ 
+(1- ()1)~(1 - ß)石~ ~一前) - ()~(1 一 α)詩;(一站)
fθZl _, ßz11 +仰1(1 一向 )(1 一 α)一一利(l-()d(卜的空三| θZ |θ~ 1 - ~ \ - - ~ I \ - , I ßr 2 I 
(7.7) 。 1 (1 - ()1) . B . E 





Using equation (7.1) , \ve obtain 
R=(71)1:1:::1 
Thus , 
8î(1 一αn (1 - ß)ß 1 - 2α 一 β
一一(1 - ()1 )2 (1 - ß) 一 (1 一 α)α1 一 α-2β
w hich is less than 1 because α>β. This im plies that term 2 in the RHS of 
equation (7.7) is positive. 
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Using the first order condition pertaining to (.ðq , r 2 ) , we can show that term 3 
in equation (7.7) equals (1- 281d) which is nonnegative since 8 1 三 1/2 (assuming 
d 三 1) . 
Finally, by part (“) of the above lemma, G > 0 and H > 0 so that term 1 
must be positive. Therefore, expression E must be positive , which establishes that 
gz>O forα > ß and 8 1 三 1/2. Thus, the optimal share 8~ 三 1/2 if α>βThe 
saine proof impli臼 that ifα 三 ß， then firm 2's share of JV must be greater or 
equal to half, namely, 8~ 三 1/2. This prov臼 the proposition . 
7.3. Proof of Proposition 3 
From the two first order conditions (4.5) and (4.6) we have: 
ðr r ß1 1 一α一βlriJα+如一 r di1 1 -α一β
γg lαJ [~2J2Q+β一 1 - l d2 J 
Since df =匈 and assumption A1 holds , the above equation can be simplified to 
I~2Jl-2α一β[α1 1一α-ß
[riJ山一2β- lß J (7.8) 
Ifα> ß, then the RHS of the above equation is greater than 1. This implies that 
r~ < [~;]主諾 <A;
by noting 1 - 2α -ß<l 一 α - 2ß and ~2 > 1. 
On the other hand , it is easy to see that α > ß is also necessary for ri < ~2. 
ln fact , suppose rî < ~2 but α 三 ß. Then 1- 2α -ß 三 1 一 α- 2ß. This implies 
that the LHS of equatiorí (7.8) is greater than 1 but the RHS is less or equal to 
1. This contradiction shows that α > ß if ri < ~2. • 
7.4. Proof of Lemma 1 
的 For the symrnetric case, denote the common profit function as 1ï* and the 
common cost parameter as d. Let 
r* = Arg max 1ï* (f) - df 
and 
ι Argmax 訢(f) - df 
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The critical value /::). C is defined by 
r (/::).C ) 7r*(r') r(F*)-dF*-2=-7一- dr' 
Suppose /::).C 三 r'. Then, 
r(rqfr(/::). C) 一歹一- dr' + 
which contradicts equation (7.9). , 
7r* (r') Jn' I 7r* (r') 2 一 -dr'+ 一互一
π*(r') - dr' < π*(r*) - dr* 
Sirnilarly, suppose r* 三 /::).C. Then, 
r(ßC ) 計(F*)-dr*-2 一 r(F*) 「(F*) 「(ßC) 、(一互一 - dr*) + (一τ一 2
7r* (r*) Jn* ~ 7r* (r' ) 
< 一乏一- dr* <一石一 -dr
which also contradicts equation (7.9). 
(7.9) 
(“) Consider the best response function of firm 1. For /::).2 < /::).f , firm 1 prefers 
buying out firm 2 to being bought out by the definition of /::).f. Since ßf < ri 
by part (i) of the lemma, investing ri will indeed guarantee 叫 (ri) >可(ß2 )
by the symmetry 泊sumption and thus enable firm 1 to buy out the JV. Thus, 
Bl (/::).2) = fr. Similarly, for /::).2 > ð.f firm 1 prefers to be bought out by investing 
f~. Since /::).f > f~ ， investing f~ leads to πi(f~) <仿(/::).2) and hence a buy-out 
by firm 2. Thus , Bl (/::).2) = f~. If ð.2 = ð.乞 firm 1 is indifferent bet\veen buying 
out and bought out , and Bl(ð. f) = {f~ ， fi}. This prov臼 part (“) .圓
7.5. Proof of Proposition 4 
By Lemma 1, Bl (/::).;) fr (because ð.;三ð.f ) and B 2 (fi) = ð.; (because 
fr 三 ff). Thus , (fi , /::).;) is a Nash equilibrium. • 
7.6. Proof of Proposition 5 
Fi的 note that (0 ,0) is not a N叫 Equilibrium (NE) by 品sumption A3. Also 
note that (X,O) is not a NE either because, given 臼sumption A3, firm 2 wants to 
deviate to (X, X). Next , (Y,O) is not a NE because assumption A3 and inequality 
(5.1) implies that firm 2 \vants to move to (Y, X). Furthermore, (Y, X) is not a 
28 
NE either because firm 1 wants to move to (0 , X) to save the investment cost G. 
Thus , by symmetry, only 伏， X) and (Y, Y) are equilibrium candida他.
First consider (X , X): Given that firm 2 plays X , firm 1 prefers X to Y since 
assumption A3 implies that 
佇立X， X) - F > π{(8 1 ， X) >π{(8 1 ， X) - G 
By assumption A3 , firm 2 also prefers X to O. Thus (X , X) is a NE. 
Next consider (Y, Y) as an equilibrium candidate. Under (Y, Y) each firm's 
payoff is !付 (81 ， Y) - G. Given that firm 1 plays Y, firm 2 prefers X to 0 by 
assumption A3 and inequality (5.1). Th凶， firm 2's best response when firm 1 
plays Y is also Y if and only if 
jπ;川) - G 全村川
This completes the proof. • 
7.7. Proof of Proposition 6 
As proved in the proof of proposition 5, strategy pairs (0 ,0) , (X,O) cannot be 
a Nash equilibrium. From assumption A3, it is obvious that (X, X) is a N臼h
equilibrium if and only if the inequality stated in the proposition holds. 
Now consider the case this inequality does not hold. In this c臼e ， firm 1 's best 
response to firm 2:s playing 0 or playing X are both Y (by noting assumption A3 
and in叩ality (5.4)). This implies that, the Nash equilibrium candidates ofthe 
game in this case can only be (Y,O): (Y, X) , and (Y, Y). It is easy to see that the 
candidate that yields the,:highest payoff (net of investment costs) for firm 2 is the 
N ash equilibrium. 圖
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